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Introduction
The fi rst integrated concept of taxation 
expenses was presented by Smith (2005), 
whose Canons of Taxation formed the starting 
point for the study of the theory and practice 
of taxation. Equity, certainty, convenience and 
effi ciency represent the principles that inform 
the development of contemporary taxation 
theory and infl uence the development of 
opinion on the additional expenses of taxation, 
both in the public and private sectors, which 
will be the main object of our interest. What 
is most signifi cantly connected to our theme 
is the effi ciency of taxation, which appears to 
be a chronic problem, and hence has been the 
focus of both theoretical and empirical work in 
recent decades. The productivity of tax offi cials 
and the compliance costs of taxpayers have 
been the focus of researchers for many years 
in all developed countries.
In contrast to the situation in older 
developed countries, the only studies of the 
administrative and compliance costs of taxation 
in Central and Eastern Europe are for Croatia, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and recently for 
Slovakia. Our goal in this paper is to add more 
about Slovakia to the list. Slovakia is a member 
of the European Union, of its EURO-zone, and 
a medium income OECD member. This paper 
focuses on the compliance costs of taxation 
with the goal to assess the level of compliance 
costs of the private sector for income taxation 
and compliance costs for employers connected 
with the administration of salaries and social 
contributions.
1. Existing Research and Approaches
The costs of taxation are analyzed in one of 
two ways. A fi rst group of authors refers only 
to the expenses of the public sector. Sandford, 
Godwin and Hardwick (1989) describe the 
“administrative costs of taxation” as a subset 
of the public sector’s expenses, in which he 
also includes so-called other or sundry costs. 
A second group of authors divide the costs 
of taxation into two subsets. The fi rst subset 
“direct administrative costs” are the direct 
costs of the public sector. The second subset 
the “compliance costs of taxation” are the 
indirect expenses of the private sector. Our 
understanding of the term “costs of taxation” is 
set out in Fig. 1 and will be used in the analytical 
part.
Investigations into the costs of taxation, 
which began before the Second World War (for 
example Haig (1935)), grew rapidly in the 1950’s 
and 1960’s (Oster & Lynn, 1955; Matthews, 
1957; Bryden, 1961; Johnston, 1963) and 
peaked with seminal works by Sandford and 
his group (1989; 1995), Slemrod and Sorum 
(1984) and Vaillancourt (1987). These latter 
researches, focusing mainly on methodological 
and conceptual problems, created the basis for 
current research on the topic.
For more recent articles, because of the 
empirical focus of this paper, we highlight only 
European research: for a very detailed wider 
overview see Evans (2003). Within Europe 
Allers (1995) covered the Netherlands, Sweden 
was dealt with by Malmer (1995), Hasseldine 
and Hansford (2002) analysed Value Added 
Tax problems in the UK, including increased 
expenses in companies with higher turnover, 
and the increasing complexity of the tax system. 
Blaufus, Eichfelder, and Hundsdoerfer (2014) 
published results for Germany on an analysis 
of time requirements, the incomes of individuals 
and society, and the use of external services, 
and Díaz and Delgado (1995) investigated the 
Spanish situation.
Compared to Western Europe, the number 
of studies directly focusing on the costs of 
taxation in Central and Eastern Europe is rather 
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limited. We are able to mention only Klun (2001; 
2003; 2004; 2009) who analyzed the situation 
in Slovenia, Blažič (2004a; 2004b) who focused 
on income taxation in Croatia (plus their 
comparative study in 2005) and especially 
the “Czech school“, headed by Vitek (see e.g. 
Vitková and Vitek (2002); Vitek, Pavel, and 
Pubal (2002); Pudil, Vybíhal, Vítek, and Pavel, 
(2004); Vítek, Pavel, and Krbová (2004); Vítek 
and Pavel (2008); Vítek (2008); Jílkova, Pavel, 
and Slavíková (2009); Pavel and Vítek (2015)).
For Slovakia, Orviska and Hudson (2003) 
should be noted, although they only deal 
with the topic indirectly, from the viewpoint of 
tax evasion, and recently our team published 
estimates for the administrative costs of 
taxation (Nemec, Pompura, & Šagát, 2015), 
using the Czech approach of Vitek (2008), who 
assumes that the total costs of tax offi ces can 
be used to deduce the administrative costs of 
taxation by weighting, where the weight is the 
proportion of tax offi ce employees involved 
in tax collection – Tab. 1. The results of this 
study are not very positive, because (similarly 
to the OECD studies) they indicate that the tax 
administration in Slovakia is very expensive. 
Other indirect resources from the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia are for example Matějka 
(2009), Hruška and Dvořáková (2013) or Hájek, 
Hamplová, Jedlička, and Kovárník (2013).
Fig. 1: Costs of taxation
Source: processed from quoted sources by authors
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2. Estimating Compliance Costs 
of Income Taxation
In this part we describe the research 
methodology (process and main assumptions 
and simplifi cations) and provide and discuss 
our fi ndings.
2.1 Methodological Issues
To obtain the necessary data needed for 
estimating the compliance costs of taxation we 
used a questionnaire (see annex for a simplifi ed 
version), distributed by electronic post and 
accessible also on line. With the goal to collect 
as precise data as possible, the research was 
undertaken in two phases – the pilot phase and 
the main phase. The goal of the pilot phase was 
to test the methodology, especially the structure 
and the contents of the questionnaire and also 
to popularize the issue, to attract tax payers to 
participate in the main phase.
A series of articles was published by 
the authors using the blog section of the 
weekly economic journal Trend to spread the 
information about the topic and the planned 
research in early 2012. The pilot phase started 
on 2012-02-21 and ended on 2012-04-24. 
During this period we received 110 responses. 
All respondents from this phase were directly 
invited to participate in the main phase. 
The purpose for such approach (limiting the 
representativeness of the sample) is simple – 
there is no the publicly available list of taxpayers 
registered for income taxes in Slovakia. In such 
a situation the standard statistical random 
selection of the sample was impossible. Our 
sample was self-selecting.
The total sample achieved was 88 
responses, from which we had to exclude eight 
respondents for formal reasons. The structure 
of the remaining 80 respondents is described 
by the Tab. 2 – where it is also compared 
with the situation in the national economy. 
The statistical signifi cance of the sample was 
tested by a Pearson test with a 5% signifi cance 
level and the achieved p-value was 0.844 for 
physical persons and 0.094 for legal persons as 
a group – this should mean that the sample has 
statistical relevance.
From the point of view of other factors that 
are important when estimating compliance 
costs (see for example Collard and Godwin 
(1999)) we provide information about the 
size that really impacts the percentage of 
compliance costs in all existing studies. 
Concerning the size, measured by the turnover, 
fourteen respondents refused to provide data. 
Amongst the rest, smaller businesses with an 
annual turnover below 25,000 EUR dominate 
(40%) – Tab. 3. This information cannot be 
exactly compared with the situation (structure of 
businesses) in the national economy, because 
the necessary national data are not available. 
However, according to existing estimates, the 
sample seems to be reasonably representative 
and we expect that the average calculations are 
not biased by the dominance of one specifi c 
size group of businesses.
%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Income tax of individuals 
– Employees X 1.77 1.96 1.64 1.48 1.62 1.81 1.65
Income tax of individuals 
– Entrepreneurs 1.98 5.86 7.64 7.92 7.04 7.92 30.76 25.51
Income tax of legal persons 2.99 1.62 1.52 1.37 1.23 1.18 2.11 1.65
Income tax – lump sum form 1.33 2.43 2.01 1.19 1.45 1.61 2.04 2.25
Property tax 0.53 1.82 1.81 19.32 14.80 14.61 13.42 31.80
VAT 3.63 1.32 1.28 1.41 1.47 1.52 1.52 1.59
Road Tax 4.10 1.97 1.72 1.16 1.52 1.00 1.26 1.12
Source: Nemec, Pompura and Šagát (2015)
Tab. 1: Administrative costs of taxation in Slovakia as a percentage of tax revenues, by specifi ed tax, 2004-2011
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As Fig. 1 indicates, compliance costs of 
taxation occur in different forms and we tried to 
include not only classic compliance costs that 
occurred internally, or were paid to external 
bodies, but also some indirect compliance 
costs – namely the value of time (see Sandford 
(1989, pp. 35-39)). We decided to value time 
at 200% of the average wage – that is 9 EUR/
hour. In other words we assume that the hourly 
value of businesses` time is twice that of the 
average employee. 
We did not include psychic costs because 
of too many diffi culties. We also did not try to 
calculate any potential monetary and non-
monetary benefi ts connected with paying taxes 
(like interest costs differences – concerning this 
issue we assumed that any interest rate losses 
were compensated by gains).
Another methodological issue was the 
estimate of the proportion of the hardware 
costs. In cases where the respondent did not 
provide concrete data about hardware costs 
used in connection with tax payments, we 
assumed lump sum annual costs of 200 EUR.
It was important to estimate the accounting 
costs to be appropriated to the total compliance 
costs. The Coeffi cient “A” is used to estimate 
what part of total accounting related costs 
can be allocated to the compliance costs of 
taxation. Coeffi cient “A” has different values, 
depending on answers by respondents to the 
question “Why do you maintain your accounting 
system”, as follows:
A = 1 for the response: “Only because this is 
legal obligation, if this were not required by law 
I would not have it”.
A = 0.6 for the response: “The main 
reason is the legal obligation, but I use some 
information from the accounting system to 
manage my business”.
A = 0.3 for the response: “Accounting is an 
unavoidable source of management information 
for us”.
The fact that we directly interviewed 
respondents to help us allocate an appropriate 
Category Our sample Total in economy
Self-employed (from total number of entrepreneurs – physical persons) 85.37% 86.42%
Other legal forms (from total number of entrepreneurs – physical persons) 14.63% 13.58%
Percentage of entrepreneurs - physical persons (individuals) in Slovakia covered by our research: 
0.01%
Limited companies (from total number of legal persons) 87.18% 93.70%
Shareholder companies (from total number of legal persons) 2.56% 3.88%
Other legal forms (from total number of legal persons) 10.26% 2.42%
Percentage of legal persons (fi rms) in Slovakia covered by our research: 0.02%
Source: own
Annual turnover Percentage from the sample
Below 25,000 EUR 40%
25,000-100,000 EUR 23%
100,000-1,000,000 EUR 16%
Over 1,000,000 EUR 8%
Did not respond 13%
Source: own
Tab. 2: Structure of our sample
Tab. 3: Size of respondents (annual turnover)
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part of the costs of their accounting system to 
compliance costs should provide better results 
compared to many other existing estimates, for 
example those made by the type of company 
(see Vitek (2008)).
The fi nal issue was to estimate what 
proportion of the total compliance cost 
should be connected with income taxation 
duties. Coeffi cient “B” is used to allocate total 
compliance costs between two taxes that fall 
within our research – income tax and value 
added tax. These are the dominant taxes, 
by revenue raised, so we ignore other small 
taxes. Coeffi cient “B” also has different values, 
depending on respondents` answers to the 
question “What is your estimate of VAT costs in 
total compliance costs”, as follows:
B = 1 for the response: “I do not pay VAT”.
B = 0.75 for the response: “Less than 25%”.
B = 0.5 for the response: “About 50%”.
B = 0.25 for the response: “More than 75%”.
2.2 Results and Discussion
The estimated compliance costs of the income 
taxation in Slovakia are presented in the Tab. 4 
and discussed by the following text.
Our fi ndings, especially the estimates of 
compliance costs for income taxation of physical 
persons, are very negative and this fact provides 
the impetus for a comprehensive discussion. To 
demonstrate the possible impacts of several 
important factors on our results, we recalculated 
the results for the following possible biases 
– the total tax revenues from income tax, the 
real total number of legal persons, replacing 
average with median data, different values 
of the coeffi cient “A” and different monetary 
values of time.
Without any doubt, the total income tax 
revenues play an important role because of the 
crisis. According to the data of the Ministry of 
Finance, the 2011 revenues from income tax of 
physical persons were 71.12% lower compared 
to pre-crisis situation. For legal persons the 
decrease was 23.67%. So the crisis meant 
that the year we chose was atypical and the 
importance of compliance costs was thereby 
exaggerated. The recalculated results for this 
factor are shown as alternative A in Tab. 5.
Another clear bias is connected with the 
offi cial data about the number of tax payers. 
The registry includes both physical and legal 
persons who are not active. We estimate that 
this group represents about 15% of the total 
numbers given. Reducing the total numbers in 
this way generates alternative B in Tab. 5.
The relatively small, though representative 
sample may be better characterized by median 
rather than average data. Replacing average 
with median data generates alternative C in 
Tab. 5.
To demonstrate the role of the coeffi cient 
“A” which allows us to estimate the share of 
compliance costs in total accounting related 
costs we recalculated the results with different 
percentages (90, 50 and 20 instead of 100, 60 
and 30) – leading to alternative D in Tab. 5.
All authors dealing with the topic had to 
decide how to covert time data to fi nancial 
values. This aspect is really important – for 
Subject:
Legal form
Average CC 
(EUR)
Total number 
of tax 
subjects
Total CC 
(EUR)
Total tax reve-
nues (EUR)
Relative CC 
(%)
CC to GDP 
(%)
Self-employed 861 481,996 414,871,309 x x x
Other physical persons 770 75,754 58,354,569 x x x
Physical persons total 473,225,878 56,402,000 839.02% 0.69%
Limited companies 4,067 181,192 736,921,800 x x x
Other companies 3,186 12,191 38,841,609 x x x
Legal persons total 775,763,409 1,645,905,000 47.13% 1.12%
Total 1,248,989,287 1,702,307,000 73.37% 1.81%
Source: own calculations
Tab. 4: Estimated costs of taxation in Slovakia in 2011: income taxation
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example Vaillancourt (1986), Klun (2003) and 
Blažič (2004a,b) decided to use the average 
wage. The recalculation of our results using the 
average wage generates alternative E in Tab. 5.
The most cautious calculation is generated 
by simultaneously applying the corrections A, B, 
and C to the compliance cost calculations. This 
corrects for possible biases due to the crisis, an 
infl ated number of taxpayers, and inaccuracies 
due to using average rather than median data. 
The revised calculation is alternative A+B+C in 
Tab. 5.
Our calculations show that even if we 
use the most cautious assumptions, the 
compliance costs of taxation in Slovakia are 
higher compared to those in most other studies 
– both in our region but also beyond it. Data 
collected by Vitek (2008) in Czech conditions 
that are similar to Slovakia, are about half 
our levels for legal persons (14.9%) but non-
comparable for physical persons (27.8%). 
Blazic (2004b) calculated the compliance costs 
of small businesses in Croatia as being 31.39% 
of income tax revenues. Vitek and Pavel (2008) 
report that compliance costs represent 5.5% 
of income tax revenues for legal persons and 
35.4% for physical persons. Only Vitkova and 
Vítek (2002) have results that are close to 
our estimates. She reports 427% for physical 
persons and 55% for legal persons.
The comparison with developed countries 
is even more negative. The lowest results for 
existing studies begin around 5% compliance 
costs to income tax revenues. For example 
Allers (1994) has 4% for the Netherlands. 
But the highest levels are still below 20%. 
For example Pope (1993) reports 14.5% for 
Australia.
3. Estimating Compliance Costs 
for Employers Connected 
with the Administration of Salaries 
and Social Contributions
For the research about employer compliance 
costs we only received 23 responses, and one 
was excluded for formal reasons. Companies 
represent 73% of the sample and physical 
persons with employees 27%. This sample is 
not statistically representative and because of 
this we only briefl y present the methodology 
and main fi ndings.
Concerning the methodology, it was not 
necessary to use any coeffi cients, because 
the salary and social contribution agenda is 
an independent part of employers´ agendas 
and its costs can be directly estimated. The 
only problematic issue was the estimate of the 
interest revenues gained by delays connected 
with the interval between deducting and paying 
over income tax and social contributions to 
the tax authorities. This should decrease 
compliance costs. The interest revenue is 
calculated as follows – monthly payments, an 
assumed 1% interest rate, with fi fteen days 
delay for paying over social contributions, and 
twenty days delay for income tax to be paid on 
behalf of employees.
According to our estimates in 2011 the 
average costs per employer to pay income 
tax and social contributions for employees 
were 4,596 EUR. With a total 155,047 
employers registered in the central registry 
the aggregate costs were 712,647,882 EUR. 
The revenues from income tax of employees 
and their social contributions in Slovakia were 
7,736,562,411 EUR (www.fi nance.gov.sk). 
Alternative CC to tax revenues total
CC to tax revenues 
physical persons
CC to tax revenues 
legal persons
Original results 73.37% 839.02% 47.13%
Alternative „A“ 53.11% 242.29% 35.98%
Alternative „B“ 62.36% 713.17% 40.06%
Alternative „C“ 40.12% 637.04% 19.67%
Alternative „D“ 61.36% 734.61% 38.29%
Alternative „E“ 62.99% 599.71% 44.59%
Alternative „A+B+C“ 24.69% 156.37% 12.76%
Source: own calculations
Tab. 5: Alternative recalculations
EM_2_2017.indd   82 14.6.2017   9:29:29
832, XX, 2017
Economics
Thus the compliance costs represent 9.21% 
of this type of state revenues, or 1.03% of 
GDP. The net gain via interest revenues was 
estimated at 3,404,255 EUR, which does not 
signifi cantly reduce compliance costs.
Conclusions
The goal of this research was to estimate the 
compliance costs of taxation in the Slovak 
Republic. Unfortunately the results are rather 
negative – even the most cautious estimates 
are higher than those reported for other 
countries. Based on the existing research and 
our data we can conclude that the Slovak tax 
system signifi cantly underperforms on both 
the administrative and compliance costs 
of taxation. And this is despite the fact that 
these two aspects of the effi ciency of taxation 
are not directly connected, for under certain 
conditions the same country may have cheap 
tax administration but a complicated system 
for taxpayers to pay their taxes. The situation 
deserves attention and motivates a search for 
some explanations.
The existence of high administrative 
costs has already been refl ected in Slovak 
government action: in 2012 the large scale tax 
system reform (UNITAS) was undertaken by the 
government. Its main goals are to improve the 
fl ow and use of information and to merge the 
collection of all taxes and social contributions 
under one administration.
However, there has been very limited 
discussion and no policy proclamations or 
concrete actions in the area of compliance costs 
in Slovakia. Moreover recent developments 
clearly show that the focus of government 
is not on simplifying the duties of taxpayers. 
Pursuing the offi cial policy of increasing tax 
revenues the government has introduced 
several new measures to prevent tax evasion. 
But all these measures are rather costly for 
honest and diligent taxpayers. An example is 
the “control statement for VAT”, employed as 
a tool to prevent carousel frauds. The authors 
do not feel that such a “one size fi ts all – for all 
taxpayers may be guilty” approach really helps, 
not least because extra universal compliance 
requirements may well lead to substantial 
increases in compliance costs. Such extra 
requirements are more effi cient if focused on 
those taxpayers whose measureable situation 
raises a signifi cant concern that they may be 
evading their taxes. Yet Slovakia is one of 
the few EU countries where taxpayers may 
not be required to explain how their wealth, 
consumption and income are related. Taxpayers 
with very high living standards may declare 
a zero taxable income without attracting offi cial 
attention.
Our data indicate that two core factors 
determine the extremely high relative level of 
compliance costs – a complicated tax system 
and a low level of income tax revenues (if we 
compare compliance costs to GDP, the results 
are less negative, but still not satisfactory). 
Both are not suffi ciently, if at all addressed by 
government action.
Concerning the low level of income 
tax revenues, more dimensions could be 
discussed. We decided to focus on tax evasion 
and tax system (tax revenues and tax rates). 
Orviska and Hudson (2003) clearly indicate 
that tax evasion is common approach in Slovak 
business, in part perhaps because the risk of 
punishment is low. For example Slovakia is 
the only EU country to apply the principle of 
“effective regret”. Even taxpayers caught by the 
tax offi ce for evasion can retrospectively pay 
their tax assessments, plus a 10% surcharge, 
and remain “clean”, provided they pay up 
before the fi nal court decision.
The revenues from the income taxation in 
Slovakia is one of the lowest in the European 
Union. According to the offi cial Eurostat data 
Slovak income (direct) tax revenues in 2012 
represented only 5.6% of GDP (one of three 
lowest). The fact that many countries have 
lower implicit tax rates for income taxation but 
higher income tax revenues is in line with above 
mentioned problem of tax evasion.
The issue of tax system complexity was 
partly addressed during the 2004 tax reform. 
This introduced a lump sum tax for small 
businesses, but it was abolished a few years 
later. Today, small businesses can use the lump 
sum costs method in completing their income 
tax forms. But the maximum level of lump sum 
costs is 40% of revenues, with a 5,040 euro 
absolute limit. This is rather discouraging and 
most businesses prefer to claim real costs.
One specifi c factor that may have had an 
impact on the limited will of the government to 
enact necessary radical changes, uncovered by 
our research, is tax illusion. During the research 
on compliance costs we asked respondents 
their opinion about such costs. The responses 
were rather surprising – 8% of respondents 
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felt that compliance costs were marginal and 
31% felt that their level was fully acceptable. 
Their views of the payroll system were not so 
positive, but even so 46% of respondents felt 
that its costs were acceptable. This situation 
provides one more – political – explanation for 
the current situation: if tax payers are not well 
informed their motivation to demand change is 
limited.
This research was supported by the Czech 
Science Foundation (GA CR) under project 
GA16-13119S “Performance management in 
public administration - theory vs. practices in 
the Czech Republic and other CEE countries”.
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Abstract
AN ESTIMATION OF THE COMPLIANCE COSTS OF SLOVAK TAXATION
Juraj Nemec, Pavol Čižmárik, Vladimír Šagát
Most authors divide the costs of taxation into two subsets. The fi rst subset “direct administrative 
costs” are the direct costs of the public sector. The second subset the “compliance costs of taxation” 
are the indirect expenses of the private sector connected with paying taxes. This paper focuses on 
the compliance costs of taxation with the goal to assess the level of compliance costs of the private 
sector for income taxation and compliance costs for employers connected with the administration 
of salaries and social contributions in Slovakia. The results, based on 2011 data show that Slovak 
businesses have very high costs connected with paying the taxes – compared to other developed 
countries and also to Slovakia’s neighbours. The estimates for physical persons are particularly 
high, even using the most cautious assumptions. The situation deserves attention and motivates 
a search for some explanations and reactions. We argue that both the low level of tax compliance, 
because of a large shadow economy, and a too complicated tax system are the key factors 
determining the situation. However, neither a simplifi cation of the tax system or real measures 
to cut tax evasion are on the agenda of the current left wing government. One specifi c factor 
that may have had an impact on the government`s limited willingness to enact necessary radical 
changes, uncovered by our research, is tax illusion. The responses to our questionnaire were rather 
surprising – 8% of respondents felt that compliance costs were marginal and 31% felt that their 
level was fully acceptable. This situation provides one more – political – explanation for the current 
situation: if tax payers are not well informed their motivation to demand change is limited.
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